SGI Security Advisory 19971201-01-P1391 - statd(1M) Buffer Overrun

SGI Security Coordinator (agent99@RELAY.CSD.SGI.COM)
Tue, 16 Dec 1997 17:40:47 -0800



Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory

Title: Buffer Overrun Vulnerability in statd(1M) Program
Title: AUSCERT AA-97.29 and CERT CA-97.26
Number: 19971201-01-P1391
Date: December 16, 1997

Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.

Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.

- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------

The statd(1M) program is a status monitoring program used to detect
failures between clients and servers.

Under normal operation, the statd program utilizes rpc routines to
converse between client and server. Unfortunately, a buffer overrun
has been discovered in the statd(1M) program which could allow arbitrary
commands to be run as the privileged user root.

Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will
be corrected in future releases of IRIX.

- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------

The statd program is installed on all Silicon Graphics IRIX systems
by default. However, only the IRIX 5.3 statd program is vulnerable
to this issue.

With a local account, this vulnerability can be exploited locally and
remotely. Depending on network configuration, this vulnerability can
also be exploited without a local account.

This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root

This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists and also reported in AUSCERT AA-97.29 and CERT
CA-97.26 security advisories.

- --------------------------
- --- Temporary Solution ---
- --------------------------

Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.

The steps below can be used to disable the statd program from being
started at system startup/reboot.

1) Become the root user on the system.

% /bin/su -

2) Chkconfig the lockd program off which will in turn disable
the statd program.

# chkconfig lockd off

*** NOTE ***

Disabling lockd and in turn the statd programs will
deactivate NFS stateful locking services.

3) At this point, to ensure proper closure and termination
of lockd and statd programs, along with restart of NFS,
a full system reboot is recommended.

# reboot

4) After the system has rebooted, ensure that the statd
program is not running, with the following command.
No output should be returned from this command.

% ps -ef | grep rpc.statd

- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------

"In this section OS specifics are covered.
We only really support 5.3 and up with patches.
In some rare cases we will provide something for 4.x and 5.2
but that is getting rarer with time. For those OS releases
that are not supported, we indicate that there is an upgrade
path available to the customer. See some of the examples below.
Also note the checksum area. Examples are below"

OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------

IRIX 3.x no
IRIX 4.x no
IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.3 yes 1391
IRIX 6.0.x no
IRIX 6.1 no
IRIX 6.2 no
IRIX 6.3 no
IRIX 6.4 no


1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section.

Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.

The SGI anonymous FTP site is ( or its
mirror, Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.

##### Patch File Checksums ####

The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:

Filename: README.patch.1391
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05716 12 README.patch.1391
Algorithm #2 (sum): 13181 12 README.patch.1391
MD5 checksum: 4B47A26AD798A2B91AFCD77BC8D53197

Filename: patchSG0001391
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 39403 4 patchSG0001391
Algorithm #2 (sum): 53279 4 patchSG0001391
MD5 checksum: C0FF368E0196D7DB9BDAC3C6732CCD44

Filename: patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 34891 39 patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 9211 39 patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw
MD5 checksum: F31D4A11EEE282FA3A1BA7B1F3F02B10

Filename: patchSG0001391.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15146 2 patchSG0001391.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 8184 2 patchSG0001391.idb
MD5 checksum: 76F14AD66D8B8C4E6782772822023DBA

Filename: patchSG0001391.nfs_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 60901 8 patchSG0001391.nfs_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 1520 8 patchSG0001391.nfs_man
MD5 checksum: 83F5CE8E5463C45CE19C1B6B4BFFC817

Filename: patchSG0001391.nfs_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40349 147 patchSG0001391.nfs_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 50891 147 patchSG0001391.nfs_sw
MD5 checksum: 1701AD638C7E3D02A4C3F193DA7F4BBD

- ------------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ---
- ------------------------

Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the AUSCERT and CERT Coordination
Center organizations for their assistance in this matter.

- -----------------------------------------------------------
- --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------------------------

If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to


Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.

The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is ( Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL

For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to

For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.


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