in.comsat DoS vulnerability

Andrew Hobgood (andrewh@WPI.EDU)
Wed, 03 Sep 1997 01:01:14 -0400

Please excuse me if this has already been mentioned on the list...

In the continuing saga of UDP ports sitting open on a machine, in.comsat
can be exploited to cause some pretty nasty problems.

For the uninitiated, in.comsat allows users who have set biff y to recieve
notification of new mail messages in their mail spool. By sending UDP
datagrams to port 512, in.comsat is started and breaks up the contents of
the datagram. The data sent is of the format "username@linenum" where
username is the user who is recieving mail, and linenum is the location in
the mail spool where the new mail resides. Therefore, sending 'root@0' to
port 512 will tell comsat to alert the user root that there is new mail,
and it'll echo up the first couple of lines (7 lines or 560 chars, I
believe) to the user's screen if A) they're logged in, and B) have biff
set to y.

Now, the problem occurs when comsat fork()'s off (about line 221). It
does this so it can handle multiple user mail reports in a single comsat
connection. Unfortunately, if you feed a huge number of username lines
very quickly to the open comsat, it'll continue to fork() off things
(which die quickly).

As many of you can figure out from here, this can be exploited very easily
over a LAN or from the local host. For instance, if you have instated
process quotas to prevent users from forkbombing your machine, they can
simply start up a few "yes 'root@0' | nc -u localhost 512 &" (which will
allow them to run quite a few things before running out of process space),
but will open up a large enough stream of garbage to comsat to make it
fork() off ad infinitum. On my Linux machine, 3 or 4 of these open
comsats is enough to make my system load hit >20.

Even if each fork()'ed process lasts for a short time, there is still
enough bandwidth over a 10Mbps LAN (or T3 for that matter) to cause a
machine to run out of PID's, or force the system load to climb higher and
higher until it crashes.

Also, comsat does *NOT* log what is sent over the comsat connection unless
there is invalid data, such as the user doesn't exist. Otherwise, the
only log entry is a single "in.comsat[PID]: connect from hostname". If
you do this from localhost, ESPECIALLY if it is preceded by some sort of
mail delivery (perhaps just fake a mail to somewhere on the machine, or
use the fun remote syslogging bug that we've all seen to fake a sendmail
connect), there is very little to indicate foul play.

Solutions? Well, either A) prevent comsat from fork()'ing (only allow it
to handle 1 line at a time) or B) disable comsat all together.

--=[ Andrew

earth:~# shutdown --apocalypse 5 `/bin/cat ~/apocalype.msg`

Broadcast message from god (console) Wed May 16 13:45:22 2000...

Earth is shutting down in 5 minutes for a system upgrade. All users please
log out or transfer to heaven.god.net or hell.god.net. Thank you.